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Abstract
For free, subsidized or cost-covering? The decision on how much to charge for a good or ser-
vice is fundamental in social business planning. The higher the fee paid by the recipient, the 
more people in need can be served by the additional revenues. But charging a fee means si-
multaneously to exclude the very poor from consumption. This paper argues that the entre-
preneur’s trade off between both effects is governed by her level of poverty aversion, i.e., her 
preference intensity for the service of needy people with different incomes. Additionally, we 
account for the possibility of excess demand for the provided good and assume that applicants 
are rationed by non-price allocation mechanisms. We thereby contribute to the extensive lit-
erature on the pricing and rationing behaviour of nonprofit firms. Within our theoretical 
model, we find ambiguous reactions of the entrepreneur to a cut in donations. Given a suffi-
ciently low level of status-quo donations, entrepreneurs with relatively high poverty aversion 
tend to increase the project volume, while those with relatively low poverty aversion do the 
opposite.
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user fee 
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11. Introduction 
Social entrepreneurship takes place where basic human needs are left unsatisfied by the 
market mechanism. Austin et al. (2006, p. 2) suggest that “this is often due to the inability of 
those needing the services to pay for them.” The entrepreneur satisfies the necessities by of-
fering subsidized goods or services as complements to the market supply. Examples are mani-
fold: Soup kitchens distribute balanced food, homeless shelters offer nighttime residence, 
charity shops sell donated second-hand goods, and micro-insurance schemes provide basic 
health securities. However, the availability of third-party funds to finance those businesses 
might be insufficient to meet the entire demand. In coping with the arising problems of con-
gestion and rationing, the social entrepreneur is confronted with two general decisions: Which 
and how many needy people will be served? The provision of eligible customers must then be 
ensured through an adequate mix of rationing instruments. According to Steinberg and Weis-
brod (1998), such instruments are diverse forms of user fees, the formulation of eligibility 
criteria, queues, waiting lists, quality dilution, product bundling etc.
In this paper we propose a positive model of the social entrepreneur’s pricing decision in 
the light of other exogenously given third-party funds
1
. We examine two effects of charging 
uniform user fees on the composition and quantity of recipients. On the one hand, charging a 
fee excludes the lowest-income individuals, who are typically considered the most needy. On 
the other hand, the entrepreneur’s budget is enlarged and enables her to serve more needy 
individuals. Given that excess demand is not completely dissolved by the user fee, we assume 
the entrepreneur to have a non-price rationing instrument at hand to achieve a utility maximiz-
ing allocation.
A similar approach is taken by Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005). They characterize pricing 
and rationing decisions of nonprofit organizations which seek to maximize the weighted sum 
of the consumers’ surpluses. In their model they allow for price discrimination and analyze 
equilibrium prices in comparison to marginal costs and reservation prices. A similarly defined 
utility function can be found in Le Grand (1975). 
1 Aside from user fees, nonprofit organizations typically generate income from additional sources, which can be 
clustered into donations and unrelated business income (Steinberg and Weisbrod, 1998). There is a thrust of 
literature dealing with aspects of each of the sources and the interactions between them. Exemplarily, contribu-
tions to the field of public or private donations highlight the role of lead donors (Andreoni, 1998, 2006), fun-
draising strategies (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002), united charities (Fisher, 1977; Bilodeau, 1992), and the 
interaction between government grants and fundraising success (Rose-Ackerman, 1987; Andreoni and Payne, 
2003). Work on unrelated business income points to disutility from engaging in commercial activities (Schiff 
and Weisbrod, 1991; Weisbrod, 1998) and agency problems within the organization (Du Bois et al., 2004). 
2However, the proposed objectives do not reflect the satisfaction of basic human needs, 
which social entrepreneurs typically consider strongly. Economic theory suggests that indi-
viduals satisfy those needs first, provided their budget is sufficiently large. Different reserva-
tion prices, as a part of consumer surplus, thus, generally point to different incomes and not to 
differently intense preferences. It is straight forward to conclude that a given user-fee level 
results in a higher surplus for wealthier recipients. Although the nonprofit organization, as 
analyzed in Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005), might weight wealthier consumers less than 
poorer, it is unclear why it should consider consumer surplus at all, since this is an inadequate 
proxy for consumer utility in social contexts. In the extreme case, the provision of individuals 
without any liquidity to bid for the good or service does not help to fulfill the firm’s goal even 
if the good is allocated to them costlessly. Consequently, they are served last, if at all. 
We overcome the pinpointed problem by assuming the social entrepreneur to attribute 
values to each individual, which reflect her attitude towards poverty and, thus, are negatively 
correlated to the recipients’ income. The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize the aggre-
gated value of served individuals. This assumption goes in line with Nichols et al. (1971, p. 
316), who claim that “[…] the poorer a person is, the more willing the public is to provide 
him […]”. Therefore, we refer to the entrepreneurial attitude as poverty aversion.
In addition to Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005), there are various other attempts to charac-
terize the objectives of social entrepreneurs and nonprofit organizations, ranging from the 
maximization of service, budget, and usage to the maximization of the number of users 
(Steinberg, 1986; Brooks, 2005; Ansari et al., 1996). All these approaches describe a social 
entrepreneur who extends the project size by charging recipients a fee until all applying indi-
viduals are served. However, they do not explain why many organizations charge no user fee 
but simultaneously face congestion.  
As a second modification of the Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) model, we exclude price 
discrimination from consideration and instead analyze uniform user fees for a number of rea-
sons. From a pragmatic perspective, one can find many examples of social enterprises typi-
cally offering their goods or services at uniform prices, e.g. soup kitchens, charity shops or 
homeless shelters. From a theoretical perspective, a detection of reservation prices might be 
prohibitively costly. In those cases, price discrimination is no option and other rationing in-
struments to implicitly allocate the good to poorer applicants, such as queues or waiting lists, 
3constitute alternatives.
2
 From a technical perspective, a uniform user fee simplifies the model. 
However, we indicate in the subsequent analysis that all derived results can be obtained with a 
consideration of price discrimination. 
The organization and results of the paper are given as follows. In section 2 we introduce a 
model of the entrepreneur’s decision calculus which accounts for the level of poverty aver-
sion, the structure of the market for the good and the applicable rationing mechanisms. In sec-
tion 3 we provide optimality conditions and formally prove the existence of corner solutions 
and interior utility maxima implying positive user fees. Section 4 analyzes a variation in third-
party funds. We find three entrepreneurial reactions. First, there is a particular level of poverty 
aversion at which user-fee revenues are reduced to exactly the same amount by which third-
party funds are increased. Hence, the project volume remains unchanged. In contrast, entre-
preneurs with a higher poverty aversion react with a reduction of the project volume and en-
trepreneurs with a lower aversion widen the scope of their service. We conclude in section 5 
with a discussion of these results.
2. The Model 
Consider a group of individuals unable to satisfy a specific basic human need due to their 
insufficient incomes. A social entrepreneur discovers the deficit and plans to allocate a need-
oriented and subsidized good on a nonprofit basis. The entrepreneur is characterized as a po-
verty-averse person, valuing the provision to an individual higher, the poorer the person is. 
This assumption goes in line with the extensive literature on the allocation of public goods 
which often assumes equity considerations or the desire to serve the poor as the driving force 
behind this activity.
3
 A similar characterization is given by Nichols et al. (1971, p. 316), who 
claim that “[…] the poorer a person is, the more willing the public is to provide him […]”. 
The social entrepreneur maximizes her utility by determining the user fee for the good. More 
specifically, in the optimum the total of the income-dependent values she attributes to each 
served individual is maximized. This is formalized in the following model. 
The constant marginal costs of producing the good are Rc . They must be covered by 
the entrepreneur’s income, which might include third-party funds, e.g. government grants, 
2 Nichols et al. (1971), Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), and in a later version Cullis and Jones (1986) provide 
theoretical analyses of the effects of rationing by waiting. 
3 See for example Alderman (1987), Glazer and Niskanen (1997), Kulshreshtha (2007), Le Grand (1975), and 
Sah (1987).  
4private donations or mission unrelated business incomes. We simply subsume those funds 
under donations RD  and assume that their total level is exogenously given. In case this 
level is insufficient to serve all individuals, there is a need to ration applicants. We model two 
rationing instruments: a uniform user fee as the entrepreneur’s decision variable and a non-
price allocation mechanism which is automatically applied if further rationing arises. The uni-
form user fee f , with    Rf,f max0  and cfmax  , mitigates excess demand by excluding 
individuals with lower reservation prices and enlarging the entrepreneur’s budget. The non-
price rationing instrument helps the entrepreneur to identify and directly serve only the poor-
est individuals with the ability to pay the fee. 
We do not consider price discrimination for a number of reasons. There are many exam-
ples of social businesses typically offering their good at a uniform price. One might hypothe-
size that those enterprises principally sell low-involvement products to a large number of in-
dividuals, such as food providing services or charity shops. Since here a detection of each 
applicant’s income, or rather reservation price, is prohibitively costly, price discrimination is 
infeasible. Even in cases where several income classes can be defined and different user fees 
are charged, a further segmentation of heterogeneous subgroups may be desirable but not 
possible. For example, the allocation of food in a university cafeteria is accompanied by a 
differentiation of prices between students, members of the university and external visitors. 
Examination of eligibility is done by student identity cards and service cards. Although stu-
dents differ in their wealth and poorer students should be subsidized more, a further segmen-
tation according to income would be too costly. In those cases, other rationing instruments, 
which implicitly allocate the good to the poorest applicants, like queues, are implemented.
4
 A 
perceptible simplification of the model constitutes another reason for analyzing uniform user 
fees. Subsequently, we argue that all derived results can be likewise shown with a considera-
tion of price discrimination. 
The demand for the good is given by 	 
fn , with    R,fn max0: , 	 
 0maxfn ,
	 
 1cn ,5 	 
 0n , 	 
 0:  fnn f  and 	 
 0:  fnn ff . It is important to note that reserva-
tion prices are uniquely determined by the individual’s ability to pay. Microeconomic theory 
suggests that a low reservation price is the result of a low income or a weak preference for the 
good. In contrast, a prerequisite for high reservation prices is a sufficiently large income. 
                                                
4 Nichols et al. (1971), Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and in a later version Cullis and Jones (1986) provide 
theoretical analyses of the effects of rationing by waiting. 
5 The assumption 	 
 1cn  simplifies subsequent proofs w.l.o.g.. 
5However, when basic human needs are concerned, we can assume that individuals will satisfy 
these first. As a consequence, low reservation fees result from limited payment abilities. Al-
though there might be deviations from this suggested behavior, we postulate a strictly positive 
correlation between income and payment willingness for the good. The resulting demand 
curve, therefore, presumes equally intense consumption preferences across all individuals and 
solely reflects the wealth of applicants. 
We further assume that each applicant intends to consume exactly one unit of the good 
and that each 	 
 00 n,n  indexes one individual with a specific disposable income. Accord-
ing to the previous argumentation, the index is negatively correlated to the individual’s reser-
vation fee and wealth, respectively. In other words, the higher the index n  is, the lower is the 
individual’s income. In particular, the individual 0n  is able to pay the prohibitive price 
maxf  whereas the poorest individual 	 
0nn   cannot afford to pay anything. At the same 
time, a specific element n  likewise denotes the total quantity of individuals with a higher 
income than n . Hence, the term 	 
fn  provides two important details. It shows the quantity of 
applicants for the good at a given user fee, and it simultaneously indexes the poorest individu-
al being even able to afford this fee.  
The social entrepreneur’s non-price rationing instrument ensures that only the poorest ap-
plicants out of the quantity 	 
fn  receive a unit of the good. This requires a direct or indirect 
detection of reservation prices. Given that the entrepreneur can directly observe reservation 
prices,
6
 she can formulate adequate eligibility criteria and directly exclude wealthier appli-
cants. Even in cases in which the entrepreneur cannot observe them, theory suggests that there 
are ways to indirectly exclude the wealthiest applicants, e.g. rationing by waiting. Therefore, 
we forego an explicit modeling of direct and indirect non-price allocation mechanisms by 
assuming that the entrepreneur has a general non-price tool at hand, which ensures the provi-
sion of the poorest applicants. The quantity of the wealthiest individuals being excluded from 
consumption is denoted by 	 
fn , with 	 
 fn,n 0 . This term likewise denotes the recipient 
with the highest income. The combined application of both rationing instruments determines 
the final quantity of recipients which is given by 	 
 	 
fnfn  .
In allocating the good to the needy, the social entrepreneur is restricted by a nonprofit-
condition. With 	 
 	 
 	 
 fnfnffF   as total user-fee receipts, the constraint is given by
                                                
6 Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) give several arguments in favor of this assumption.  
6(1) 	 
 	 
 	 
 fnfncDfF  .
The nonprofit-condition requires the social entrepreneur to spend her total revenues complete-
ly on the supply of the good. By rearranging equation (1), one obtains 
	 
 	 
 	 
 fcDfnfn  , which shows the endogenous determination of the wealthiest reci-
pient for a given fee f . With the poorest individual able to afford the user fee given by 	 
fn ,
a total of 	 
 	 
fnfn   recipients can be served when the entire donations D  are spent to 
finance the gap between marginal costs and individual contribution ( fc  ).  
Figure 1 summarizes the impact of the entrepreneur’s rationing mechanisms on the mar-
ket. In panel (a) the entrepreneur allocates the good for free. All individuals of the target 
group are willing to purchase the good but, due to the limited donations, only the fraction 
	 
 	 
00 nn   is served and the wealthiest 	 
0n  individuals are rationed by the non-price in-
strument. Since the entrepreneur’s budget is not enlarged by additional user-fee revenues, the 
project shows the lowest possible volume. Panel (b) considers the combined use of both ra-
tioning instruments. The entrepreneur chooses the user fee 1f  which rations the poorest 
	 
 	 
10 fnn    applicants who are unable to afford the good. Although this fee increases total 
revenues at first, the budget remains insufficient to provide all applying individuals 
	 
  	 
	 
11 fncDfF  . Consequently, the entrepreneur excludes the wealthiest 	 
1fn  appli-
cants by use of the non-price mechanism. In contrast, panel (c) considers the exclusive supply 
of the most solvent individuals. The entrepreneur chooses the user fee which maximizes her 
total revenues, subject to the nonprofit-condition. This ensures that the maximum quantity of 
applicants is served.  
An additional effect of the nonprofit-constraint is the unique relationship between the user 
fee and total user-fee revenues. Inserting 	 
 	 
 	 
 fnfnffF   into equation (1) yields 
(2) 	 

fc
DffF


 .
According to this equation, the entrepreneur’s choice of f  determines her total receipts 
	 
fF . Subsequently, we take advantage of this relationship and reverse it. We characterize 
the social entrepreneur’s choice in terms of F  instead of the individual fee. At a later stage, 
this allows for a direct derivation of the project size DF   and, therefore, simplifies the anal-
ysis.
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Figure 1: The allocative outcome of rationing by user fees and the non-price instrument.  
Rearranging equation (2) yields the implicit function  
(3) 	 

DF
FcF


f  , 
with  
	 

	 

0:
2




DF
DcFF ff
and
	 

	 

0
2
:
3




DF
DcFFF ff .
Employing equation (3) into the demand function yields
(4) 	 
	 
 








DF
FcnFn f  , 
with  
(5) 	 
	 
 0:  FfF nFnn ff
and
(6) 	 
	 
 0: 2  FFfFffFF nnFnn fff .
Next, we assume that the entrepreneur draws a nonnegative level of utility from each al-
located unit of the good to a target-group individual, which is specified by the value function 
(7) 	 
 nnu  .
8>
=
<
Here, the parameter  R  determines the constant elasticity of marginal utility 1
7
and is likewise a measure for the curvature of the value function. Marginal utility is decreas-
ing with 	 
10, , constant with 1 , and increasing with .1  As with the class of 
Cobb-Douglas utility functions,   characterizes the entrepreneur’s preference intensity for 
recipients with different incomes and will be subsequently interpreted as the entrepreneurial 
poverty aversion. Specifically, for 0  the entrepreneur shows no aversion and values the 
service of each individual the same.
8
 However, given a positive level of poverty aversion 
	 
0 , the entrepreneur obtains a utility surplus from substituting the provision of a lower-
income for a higher-income individual. This surplus increases as   grows and becomes infi-
nite with  . As will be shown later, entrepreneurs with such extreme aversions are pre-
determined to serve only the poorest target group individuals. 
The entrepreneur maximizes her aggregated utility of served individuals by implicitly 
choosing total user-fee revenues F . According to equation (3), this choice uniquely correlates 
to a specific price level for the good 	 
	 
Ff f . Individuals who cannot afford f  are barred 
from consumption and, if total revenues are insufficient to serve the remaining applicants (i.e. 
	 
 	 
	 
FncDF f ), the non-price allocation instrument is implemented to exclude the 
wealthiest individuals 	 
	 
Fn f  from consuming the good, because they provide the least value 
to the social entrepreneur. Finally, only the poorest applicants with the ability to pay f re-
ceive a unit. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s maximization problem can be written as
9
 (8)
	 

	 
 .cDFnn.t.s
dnnFUmax
n
nF

  
By employing the rearranged nonprofit-constraint into the utility function, one obtains the 
following first and second derivative: 
(9)
	 
 	 
 01
c
nnnn
dF
D;FdU
F 

and
                                                
7 The elasticity of marginal utility is defined as 
	 

	 
nu
n
dn
nud



 .
8  With  = 0, the value of serving individual 0n  is not defined. To simplify this case, we set 	 
 10 u .
9 In the maximization problem and subsequent derivations we simplify the explicit notation 	 
	 
Fn f  and 
	 
	 
Fn f  by use of n  and n .
9>
=
<
(10) 	 
 	 
 0111 1112
2
2
c
nn
c
n
cn
nnnnn
dF
D;FUd
F
F
FFF 



 

 
! 






  
 .
In the next section we prove the possibility of interior utility maxima and corner solutions.  
3. Interior and Corner Solutions 
It is important to keep in mind that the entrepreneur can solely enhance her user-fee reve-
nues through an increase of the user-fee level. The unique quantitative relationship between 
both variables is given by equation (2). Although, this equation comprises additional parame-
ters like the amount of donations or the marginal costs of producing the good as well, they are 
outside the entrepreneur’s scope of influence.
We define the following terms. The optimal level of user-fee revenues will be denoted by 
F  and the corresponding user fee by f . Furthermore, the maximum user-fee revenues will 
be denoted by maxF  which is achieved if the entrepreneur’s total income suffices to serve all 
applying needy. Consequently, 0n  and maxF  fulfills the reduced nonprofit-condition (1), 
i.e.  
(11) 	 
	 
maxmax FncDF f .
The entrepreneur’s mission is achieved best if all individuals of the target group receive 
one unit of the good. Hence, a costless provision of beneficiaries is required to avoid a ration-
ing of the poorest individuals. Consequently, the production costs of serving the total target 
group must be completely covered by donations 	 
	 
cnD  0 . If donations are not available 
	 
0D , i.e. the applicants’ provision is not externally subsidized, the entrepreneur must re-
frain from the allocation of the good or, alternatively, serve only those individuals who can 
afford a cost covering user fee 	 
cf  . The dominance of the second option results from val-
ue function (7). Since any individual of the target group is assigned a nonnegative value 	 
nu ,
serving only individuals who can afford the good is preferred to non-provision. Total utility 
(equation (8)) is maximized if all applicants who show a payment ability of at least marginal 
production costs c  are served. 
Proposition 1. Given 0D , the entrepreneur charges a cost covering user fee 	 
cf   and 
serves all needy individuals that can afford to apply, 	 
cn .
10
Proof. With 0D , equation (3) yields 	 
 cF f . Substituting c  for 	 
Ff  in utility function 
(8) and differentiating with respect to F  yields 	 
 	 
 010  cndF;FdU  . Consequently, 
utility is maximized if all 	 
cn  applicants are served. Q.e.d.
Now, suppose total donations amount to 	 
	 
cn,D~  00 , which suffices to initially serve 
	 
0ncD~   applicants. Confronted with the resulting excess demand, the social entrepreneur 
determines her optimal level of user-fee revenues, which, again, is a choice of how many in-
dividuals are excluded by the user fee and how many are rationed by the non-price rationing 
instrument. According to the first derivative (9), the increase of user-fee receipts F  is accom-
panied by two effects on the entrepreneur’s utility. First, there is a non-positive crowding-out
effect 	 
 0" Fnnn  . Let revenues and, equivalently, the quantity of recipients be con-
stant, then an increase in user fees cuts off the poorest from consumption and shifts the re-
leased units of the good to wealthier individuals. This effect is utility neutral only if the entre-
preneur values all individuals equally. In contrast, given a positive level of poverty aversion 
 , the substitution of wealthier for poorer beneficiaries decreases her utility. The second term 
of equation (9) denotes the nonnegative revenue effect 	 
 01  cn . The additional user-fee 
receipts enable the entrepreneur to extend the quantity of recipients which increases her utili-
ty. The value of the revenue effect becomes zero if all applicants are served.  
Dependent on the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion, both interior and corner solutions are 
possible. If the crowding-out effect dominates the revenue effect for any level of user-fee rev-
enues, the entrepreneur allocates the good for free 	 
0F  and rations applicants by the non-
price instrument. Intuitively, the higher the poverty aversion is, the less the entrepreneur is 
willing to substitute wealthier for poorer individuals and the sooner she foregoes charging a 
user fee. On the other hand, if the revenue effect exceeds the crowding-out effect independent 
of the level of user-fee receipts, the entrepreneur generates maximum revenues 	 
maxFF 
and serves the maximum quantity of beneficiaries. This corner solution arises for a non-
poverty averse entrepreneur for whom applicants are perfect substitutes. Finally, there are 
interior utility maxima for moderate levels of poverty aversion 	 
maxFF  0 . The value of 
the initially dominant revenue effect is offset by the crowding-out effect at some positive lev-
el of user-fee revenues and overcompensated for higher levels. Consequently, as exemplarily 
depicted in figure 1 (b), the poorest applicants are rationed by the user fee and the wealthiest 
11
applicants are excluded by the non-price allocation mechanism. In the next three propositions, 
we show the possibility of interior and corner solutions.
Proposition 2. Given 	 
	 
00 nc,D  , there exists a finite poverty aversion level   such that 
for all   , 0F .
Proof. For notational clarity, we temporarily expand the term 	 
D;FU  to 	 
,D;FU  to em-
phasize the influence of the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion. Let 	 
	 
00 nc,D  . Since 
0nF   and nn  , there exists a finite 	 


 
! 






 nlnnln
cn
ln
F
1
1  for all  maxF,F 0
which implies 	 
 	 
cnnnn F 1  . Since the revenue effect does not exceed the 
crowding-out effect for all levels of user-fee revenues, an entrepreneur with the poverty aver-
sion level   chooses 0F  . Since, by definition, 	 
 1cn ,
	 

0
12





 
##
#
c
nnnlnnnnln
F
,D;FU
FF



 and the first derivative (9) is negative, 
given  maxF,F 0  and   . Consequently, 0F . Q.e.d. 
According to proposition 2, any social entrepreneur with a level of poverty aversion equal 
or higher than a specific value   does not wish to charge user fees.10 For those entrepreneurs 
the first derivative of the utility function (equation (9)) is non-positive. This result is mainly 
driven by the utility difference between the poorest and the wealthiest marginal recipient, 
which is a component of the crowding-out effect. Since this difference increases with the en-
trepreneur’s poverty aversion, there exists a specific level, above which the crowding-out ef-
fect dominates the revenue effect for all levels of user-fee revenues. Consequently, utility is 
maximized if the entrepreneur refrains from charging user fees and finances its allocation ex-
clusively by donations.
Proposition 3. Given 	 
	 
00 nc,D  , there exists a positive poverty aversion level  "ˆ
such that for all  ˆ , 0F .
                                                
10 The same results arise with a consideration of price discrimination. Intuitively, since reservation prices, to 
some extent, are lower than marginal costs, recipients must be subsidized by donations or ‘cash cows’ (Steinberg 
and Weisbrod, 2005). If revenues are insufficient to allocate the good to all applicants, the entrepreneur must 
ration them and decide who and how many needy will be served. If she chooses the poorest applicants, this re-
quires the highest individual subsidies and benefits the lowest quantity of recipients. In contrast, the maximum 
quantity of recipients follows from serving the wealthiest applicants. It is important to note that a change of 
quantity causes the same qualitative effects on the entrepreneur’s utility: a non-positive crowding-out effect and 
a nonnegative revenue effect. For the same reason, interior and corner solutions are possible and depend on the 
entrepreneur’s level of poverty aversion. 
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Proof. Let 	 
	 
00 nc,D   and 	 
 011
0


 
! 







FF
nlnnln
cn
lnˆ .  ˆ  then implies 
	 
 	 
 
0
1


FF
nnncn  , which is a necessary condition for the existence of a utility 
maximum with 0F . Q.e.d.11
Proposition 3 claims that any social entrepreneur with sufficiently low poverty aversion 
chooses a positive level of user fees. Again, consider the entrepreneur’s marginal utility (equ-
ation (9)) for the first unit of user-fee revenues. In line with the intuition of the previous prop-
osition, with a poverty aversion below a specific level ˆ  the utility difference between the 
poorest and the wealthiest marginal recipient and, hence, the crowding-out effect are suffi-
ciently low. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s marginal utility is positive and user fees are 
charged. 
Proposition 4. Given 	 
	 
00 nc,D  , there exists a strict corner solution with maxFF 
 , if, 
and only if, 0 .
Proof. Consider the first derivative of the utility function (9). Let 	 
	 
00 nc,D   and 0 .
Since 0n  and, by definition, 0Fn , 	 
 0

FFF
nnnlim
max
  and 	 
 01 

cnlim
maxFF

.
Hence, 	 
 0

dFD;FdUlim
maxFF
 and maxFF 
 . In contrast, let 0 . Since, 
	 
 0 Fnnn   and 	 
 01  cn , 	 
 0dFD;FdU  for all  maxF,F 0  and maxFF  .
Q.e.d.
According to proposition 4, only non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs choose the corner so-
lution with the maximum of user-fee revenues maxF . For a deeper understanding of the result 
consider again the entrepreneur’s marginal utility (equation (9)). Given a positive level of 
poverty aversion, the crowding-out effect is strictly negative, since the substitution of lower-
valued wealthier for higher-valued poorer individuals always entails a loss in utility. Concern-
ing the revenue effect, on the other hand, the additional utility the entrepreneur gains from 
enlarging the group of recipients through additional user-fee receipts approaches zero since 
                                                
11 The set  
ˆ,0  is far from being complete. One can show that there are global utility maxima for higher levels of 
poverty aversion which start with a dominant crowding-out effect for the first unit of user fees 
	 
 	 
  	 
 
0
1

"
F
FnnFncn  . The increase of fees initially decreases utility to some minimum be-
fore the revenue effect overcompensates the utility loss and induces a global maximum. Since all important re-
sults can be proved without an extension to these special cases, we simplify the analysis by ignoring them. 
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the wealthiest recipient 	 
0n  is of no value to the entrepreneur. As a result, there is a level 
of user-fee revenues at which both effects offset each other and, hence, maxFF 
 . In con-
trast, non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs assign equal value to each individual, which implies 
that there is no crowding-out effect. The marginal utility is characterized by a nonnegative 
revenue effect implying that the maximum user-fee revenues maxF  are chosen. 
The graphical characterization of propositions 2-4 is presented in figure 2. It contrasts to-
tal revenues DF  , also considered as project volume, and the entrepreneur’s overall utility 
	 
D;FU . As an important point of reference, the graph 	 
D;U 0 , with  
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denotes the upper utility boundary for any given project volume. It considers utility as a pure 
function of donations D , which implies an allocation of the good free of charge. Its concave 
shape accounts for the impact of the entrepreneur’s non-price rationing instrument on the se-
quence of the applicants’ provision. A poorer individual with a likewise higher value is served 
prior to the next wealthier applicant. The entrepreneur’s marginal utility of an additional reci-
pient, therefore, is decreasing. Her aggregated utility reaches a maximum if all applicants are 
served through donations 	 
	 
cnD  0 .
The lower boundary of the utility spectrum is given by 	 
0;FU , which presumes the non-
availability of donations. According to equation (3), in this case, the social entrepreneur 
chooses a user fee equal to marginal costs and allocates the good to applicants successively. 
The user-fee revenues thereby increase with the quantity of served individuals. The corres-
ponding utility function is given by 
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Figure 2: A utility function for a moderate level of poverty aversion and the interior optimum. 
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The maximum project size is reached at 	 
 	 
 cnccnFmax  0 , i.e. a lower level compared 
to the maximum volume resulting from complete donation financing. 
In figure 2, the right increasing dashed graph 	 
D;FU max  connects both elements. It de-
picts the entrepreneur’s utility in dependence on the maximum project volume. Since a maxi-
mum project size implies 0n , 	 
D;FU max  is obtained by rearranging the reduced nonprof-
it-condition (11) to 	 
	 
 	 
 cDFFn maxmax f  and inserting it into the utility function:  
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The curvature shown in figure 2 can be explained as follows. The larger the initial donation 
D  is, the less user-fee revenues are needed to reach a certain project volume DF   and, 
hence, the fewer applicants are excluded. Consequently, more individuals can be served by a 
further increase of the user fee which extends the maximum project volume. 
The three boundaries define the spectrum of possible utility functions. As an example, 
consider the graph 	 
D~;FU . At D~  the entrepreneur charges no user fee and the service of the 
poorest cD~  individuals provides her with utility of 	 
D~;U 0 . The introduction of user fees 
initially enhances the entrepreneur’s utility due to a dominating revenue effect. As the project 
volume reaches D~F   the crowding-out effect offsets the revenue effect, and an interior 
utility maximum results.  
4. Variation in Donations 
In figure 2, the social entrepreneur’s donations amount to D~  and the project volume 
D~F   is chosen. In this section, we analyze how the optimal choice of user-fee revenues 
and, hence, the optimal project volume change when donations increase. We argue that vari-
ous results are possible and that their occurrence strongly depends on the entrepreneurs’ level 
of poverty aversion and the status-quo level of donations. More specifically, given that the 
initial level of donations is sufficiently low, the project volume increases for relatively low 
levels of poverty aversion and it decreases for relatively high levels. Moreover, there is a spe-
cific value of   for which the optimal project size remains unchanged. However, given that 
the status-quo level of donations is relatively high, all entrepreneurs increase the project vo-
lume.  
This section primarily focuses on the second entrepreneurial reaction, namely the reduc-
tion of the optimal project size, since this appears to be least intuitive. Figure 3 characterizes 
the change of the allocative outcome.
12
                                                
12 For notational clarity the terms 	 
fn  in figure 3 and 	 
fF  are expanded to 	 
D;fn  and 	 
D;fF  to em-
phasize the influence of donations. 
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Figure 3: A decrease of the optimal project volume as the highly poverty-averse entrepreneurial reaction.
Figure 3 shows the direct effect of the exogenous increase of donations and then decom-
poses the entrepreneur’s reaction into two steps. Consider first panel (a). Given a constant 
user fee, an increase in donations additionally increases the user-fee revenues. This result is 
obtained by differentiating total entrepreneurial revenues with respect to donations, where 
user-fee revenues are given by equation (2), 
(12)
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As a consequence, the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of charging user fees decreases:  
(13)
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Intuitively, consider the particular project volume 	 
 	 
111 D;fnfn    at which the crowding-
out effect 	 
	 
0" Fnnn   and the revenue effect 	 
	 
01  cn , as defined by equation 
(9), offset each other. Now, the increase in donations enables the entrepreneur to cover the 
difference between marginal costs and user fee for previously unconsidered applicants. More-
over, the fee paid by the new recipients additionally increases the entrepreneur’s revenues. As 
a result, the value of the “new” wealthiest recipient 	 
21 D;fn   is lower and the marginal utili-
ty of increasing the user fee becomes negative. 
As a consequence, the entrepreneur wishes to reduce the user-fee receipts to readjust the 
crowding-out and the revenue effect. Given that this reduction does not compensate for the 
previous increase in total revenues, the optimal project volume rises compared to the status 
17
quo. On the other hand, the optimal project size decreases if the user fee reduction overcom-
pensates the previous increase in total revenues. In this case, the absolute change of the entre-
preneur’s marginal utility (equation (9)) is larger for an increase of donations than for a de-
crease of user-fee revenues. 
The analysis of the entrepreneur’s reduction of user-fee receipts is decomposed into two 
steps illustrated by panels (b) and (c) in figure 3. In panel (b) we consider a first reduction 
such that the project volume reaches the status-quo level 
	 
 	 
  	 
 	 
 	 
111222 D;fnfnD;fnfn   . This partial adjustment provides an important result: 
The equally large reduction of user-fee revenues increases the revenue effect of equation (9) 
to the same extent as the marginal utility decreases due to the additional donations (equation 
(13)).
13
 In other words, if we leave the crowding out of recipients unconsidered, any variation 
in revenues (i.e. donations or user fees) identically affects the entrepreneur’s marginal utility. 
As a consequence, it suffices to analyze the impact of the considered user fee reduction on the 
non-positive crowding-out effect. Given that this effect decreases, the resulting total change 
of the revenue and crowding-out effect is, in absolute terms, larger for an increase of dona-
tions than for a decrease of user-fee revenues. We assume this scenario to be given in figure 3. 
Therefore, in panel (b), the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of charging additional user fees is 
negative at the status-quo project volume 	 
 	 
222 D,fnfn   and the entrepreneur is induced to 
further reduce user-fee revenues until the new optimal project volume 	 
 	 
222 D,fnfn    is 
reached. This outcome is characterized in panel (c).
A sufficiently high level of poverty aversion, which exceeds the specific lower limit  14,
causes a decreasing crowding-out effect for the following reason. In figure 3, panel (b), the 
values of the two marginal recipients 	 
2fn   and 	 
22 D;fn  , as components of this effect, are 
strictly higher than in panel (a) 	 
 	 
	 
111 and D;fnfn  . Since both values are weighted expo-
nentially by the entrepreneur’s level of poverty aversion, the utility difference between the 
marginal recipients is larger in panel (b). In other words, the utility loss of substituting the 
wealthiest for the poorest marginal recipient is c. p. larger, the poorer both individuals are, 
and, consequently, the lower the non-positive crowding-out effect is.
The effect of increasing donations on the social entrepreneur’s utility function is depicted 
in figure 4. According to figure 3, the figure likewise characterizes a reduction of the optimal 
                                                
13 This result is shown within the next proof. 
14 The conditions specifying   are presented within the next proof. For the current argumentation it suffices to 
set 1 .
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project volume. In the status quo, the entrepreneur receives the donations 1D  and chooses the 
optimal level of user-fee revenues 1F . Now, consider an increase in donations to 2D . Since 
the entrepreneur shows a relatively high level of poverty aversion, she reduces user-fee re-
ceipts to an even larger extent 	 
1221 DDFF   , which decreases the optimal project vo-
lume.  
U
F,D1D
	 
1D;0U
	 
1D;FU
 11 FD
	 
11 D;FU 
	 
22 D;FU 
2D
	 
2D;0U
 22 FD
	 
2D;FU
Figure 4: The shift of the utility function due to an increase in donations. 
It is important to highlight again: The social entrepreneur’s choice of a positive level of 
user-fee revenues in the status quo is a necessary precondition to the characterized result in 
figures 3 and 4. According to proposition 3, this choice requires that the level of poverty aver-
sion falls short of a specific value ˆ . However, the entrepreneur reduces the project volume 
in response to increased donations if her poverty aversion exceeds the lower limit  . Given 
that ˆ  falls short of  , all entrepreneurs with a poverty aversion level below ˆ  charge user 
fees but, given donations increase, all of them react with an enlargement of the project vo-
lume. In contrast, those entrepreneurs who, in principle, show the propensity to reduce the 
optimal project size 	 
   do not charge user fees in the status quo. Instead, their project 
volume increases by the amount of the additionally obtained donations. Consequently, only if 
 ˆ , the predicted behavior occurs. The next proposition shows that a sufficiently low level 
of status-quo donations ensures that  ˆ . Moreover, it will be proven that an increase in 
donations leads to a reduction of the optimal project volume if the entrepreneur’s poverty 
aversion falls between both parameter values. 
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Proposition 5. There exists a level of donations 	 
 cn'D  0  and a level of poverty aversion 
 , such that for all  
'D,D 0  and 	 
 ˆ, , an increase in donations leads to a reduction 
of the optimal project volume DF  .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Corollary. Given  
'D,D 0  and let donations increase, then entrepreneurs with    do not 
change and entrepreneurs with    increase the optimal project volume DF  .
Proof. Consider again the proof of proposition 5. An increase in donations leads to a constant 
optimal project volume if 	 
  fccdDdF  or, equivalently, if the value of equation 
(A.1), namely % , is zero. The proof showed that this is uniquely fulfilled for   . On the 
other hand, an increase in the optimal project volume requires that 	 
  fccdDdF
which gives a negative sign of % . The proof showed that this is fulfilled for all   . Q.e.d.
Proposition 5 consists of two parts. First, it claims that social entrepreneurs reduce their 
project volume in response to increased donations if their level of poverty aversion exceeds 
the lower limit  . The intuition of the proposition follows the argumentation given previous-
ly in this section. Accordingly, for those high levels of   the non-positive crowding-out ef-
fect decreases if user-fee revenues are reduced. Moreover, as the corollary outlines, the 
crowding-out effect and, hence, the optimal project volume remain unchanged if    and 
increase if   .
Second, a precondition to the result of the proposition’s first part is the imposition of user 
fees in the status quo or, equivalently, a level of poverty aversion below ˆ . Only if   falls 
short of ˆ  there is room for the existence of entrepreneurs decreasing the project volume. 
This requirement is fulfilled if the status-quo level of donations is sufficiently low. The cor-
responding intuition proceeds as follows. As the extreme case, consider an entrepreneur with 
an infinitesimal amount of donations. With these funds at hand she is restricted to serve only 
an insignificant quantity of individuals. Hence, the exponentially weighted value difference 
between the marginally poorest and the marginally wealthiest recipient, i.e. the crowding-out 
effect, is negligible for finite levels of poverty aversion. However, there exists a significant 
revenue effect because an increase of one unit of user-fee receipts enables the entrepreneur to 
considerably enlarge the group of recipients compared to the initial quantity. Therefore, the 
level of poverty aversion ˆ  at which the negative (and insignificant) crowding-out effect 
outweighs the positive (and significant) revenue effect is infinitely large. On the other hand, 
20
consider an entrepreneur with initial donations sufficing to serve almost all individuals. Here, 
since the absolute value of the crowding-out effect reaches its maximum whereas the revenue 
effect becomes infinitesimal ( 0n ), the level of poverty aversion at which the crowding-out 
effect dominates the revenue effect approaches zero. As a result, possible values of ˆ  range 
from zero to infinity and are negatively correlated to the status-quo amount of donations. 
In contrast, the parameter value   is finite. Consider again the discrete project volume 
depicted in figure 3, panel (b). As argued previously, an entrepreneur with the poverty aver-
sion   is indifferent between the status-quo volume 	 
 	 
222 D,fnfn   and a smaller one re-
sulting from a marginal reduction of user fees. Since any of those comparisons always pre-
sumes a positive level of user-fee revenues, both project sizes are significant. Consequently, 
an entrepreneur valuing the two project volumes equally must have a finite level of poverty 
aversion  . Comparing this result with the argued range of ˆ -values, it follows that   falls 
below ˆ  if the status-quo amount of donations is relatively low. 
The results of this section can be summarized as follows. Given that the status-quo level 
of donations is sufficiently low, an increase in donations leads to mixed reactions of social 
entrepreneurs concerning their optimal choice of the project size (measured in total revenues 
DF  ). Specifically, relatively low poverty-averse entrepreneurs increase the project vo-
lume while those with relatively high aversion decrease it. Moreover, entrepreneurs with a 
specific value   do not change the volume at all. However, given that the status-quo level of 
donations is relatively high, all entrepreneurs increase the project volume. In the next section, 
we conclude with a discussion of these results. 
5. Conclusion 
Our objective in this paper was to develop a positive model of the pricing decision of a 
social entrepreneur in the light of other exogenous and limited third-party funds. Beside the 
user fee, we assumed the entrepreneur to handle congestion by applying a non-price rationing 
instrument. It enables the entrepreneur to provide the good to her most valued applicants that 
are able to pay the user fee. In line with the existing literature on the allocation of public 
goods, we assumed that a recipient is preferred more, the poorer the person is. Accordingly, 
we proposed a utility function which accounts for the entrepreneur’s degree of poverty aver-
sion. Subject to a nonprofit-condition, the entrepreneur maximizes the aggregated value of 
served individuals.  
21
Concerning the optimal user fee and, correlated with it, the optimal project volume, we 
found three qualitatively different outcomes. First, given that the entrepreneur shows no po-
verty aversion and values all individuals equally, she decides for the user fee which maximiz-
es the project size. Rationing arises exclusively for the poorest applicants who lack the neces-
sary payment ability. Second, if poorer individuals receive a larger value than wealthier appli-
cants, allocations arise, in which a moderate user fee is chosen and applicants on both ends of 
the income scale are rationed. Finally, given a sufficiently high poverty aversion, the good is 
allocated for free and the poorest individuals receive the good. In this case, the entrepreneur 
exclusively rations the wealthiest applicants by use of the non-price allocation mechanism.  
As we have shown with our analysis, the introduction of a poverty aversion parameter in-
to the entrepreneur’s utility function enables us to explain observable nonprofit practices. 
There are social businesses being confronted with substantial congestion but, simultaneously, 
do not charge user fees at all, such as soup kitchens or homeless shelter. At the other extreme, 
there may be nonprofit businesses in similar situations charging sufficiently high prices to 
supply all applicants, such as university cafeterias or youth hostels. One can also observe or-
ganizations which set positive user fees and face excess demand. Consider micro health insur-
ance schemes in India. Recipients pay relatively low insurance premiums but only certain 
population groups gain access.
15
Our analysis additionally showed that an increase of donations might not necessarily lead 
to an increase of the project volume. Entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of poverty 
aversion will wish to reduce their user-fee revenues to an even larger extent, although this 
theoretical phenomenon has yet to be confirmed empirically. Nevertheless, the result should 
be of particular interest to lead donors, typically granting a significant and often the largest 
part of the initial financial need of social entrepreneurs.
16
 If donor and entrepreneur disagree 
on the optimal quantity and composition of recipients, their regulation in form of a variation 
of the donation volume may have unintended effects which should be taken into account. 
                                                
15 See McCord et al. (2001). 
16 See Andreoni (1998, 2006). 
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 5. Let 	 
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Then, according to proposition 3, 0F .17 Now, consider equation (12). With 0 ff ,
an increase in donations enlarges the entrepreneur’s total income by 	 
 fcc . Consequent-
ly, an increase in donations leads to a decrease of the optimal project volume if 
	 
  fccdDdF . Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition 
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Hence, the optimal project volume decreases if  
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The two terms of condition (A.1) characterize the change of the crowding-out effect due to an 
increase in user-fee revenues. The first term is positive by definition and the second term is 
nonnegative for all   , with  
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17 Although ˆ  is not defined for 0D , recall that, according to proposition 1, all entrepreneurs charge user 
fees.
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Next, we show that a unique 	 
  ,0  exists for which %  is zero. Hence, %  is positive for 
all    and negative for all   .
Rearranging equation (A.1) yields 
(A.2)  	 
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With nn  , 0Fn , and 0FFn , 	 
n,y   is the product of a linear and a convex increasing 
function of  . Hence, 	 
n,y   is also increasing and convex in  . On the other hand, 	 
n,z 
is linearly increasing in  . Consequently, the difference of both terms, %~ , has maximally 
two roots. Apparently, one is given for 0 .18 There exists a second root for 0   if 
and only if 	 
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This condition holds since 0  implies that maxFF 
  and 0n .19 Although the limits 
of y  and z  are infinity for 0n , the application of l’Hôpital’s rule shows that y  and z
diverge and  yz   results: 
                                                
18 This technical result does not imply that non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs do not change their project size if 
donations increase. Rather, in line with proposition 4, non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs behave project-size 
maximizing. Consequently, their project volume increases with higher donations. The zero-value of equation 
(A.1) emanates from the fact, that a crowding-out effect does not exist for 0  and, hence, does not change if 
user-fee revenues are increased.  
19 Rearranging the first-order condition (setting equation (9) zero) yields 	 
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Consequently, there exists a unique 	 
  ,0  for which the value of %~ , or respectively % ,
is zero. 
Yet, we assumed that  ˆ  and derived the requirement, that   . Consequently, an 
increase in donations leads to a reduction of the optimal project volume if  ˆ  and 
	 
 ˆ, . However,  ˆ  requires a sufficiently low level of donations. For 	 
 cnD  0 ,
nlnnln  , which determines ˆ  and  , is infinitely large, such that 0ˆ  and 1 .
Since   , it must hold that 	 
10,  and, consequently,  ˆ . In other words, given that 
the amount of donations is relatively high, all entrepreneurs react with an enlargement of the 
project volume on an increase in donations. In contrast, for 0D , 	 
 0
0
 Fnlnnln  and, 
hence, ˆ . According to proposition 3, all entrepreneurs with  ˆ  choose F >0. Con-
sequently, 	 
 0 FFnlnnln  and 	 
 ,1 . Since  

, it holds that  ˆ . As a result, 
there exists a specific level of donations 'D  such that  ˆ , if DD  , and  ˆ , if 
 
'D,D 0 . Hence, for all  
'D,D 0  an increase in donations leads to a reduction of the op-
timal project volume DF  , if 	 
 ˆ, . Q.e.d.
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